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Abstract
Research has examined how education systems affect student achievement. Much of this research
has compared comprehensive systems of schooling with tracked (selective) systems with regard to
the degree to which they influence social class gradients in educational achievement. This study
looks at comprehensive schooling in a broader way. Using standardised cross-national data for 31
European countries, it examines whether the comprehensiveness of education systems – in terms
of pre-primary education, public/private sectors, educational tracking, and annual instruction time
– contributes to explain the transmission of educational advantage from parents to children. Results
suggest that the effect of parental education on a child’s educational achievement is stronger in
highly tracked education systems and in systems with a shorter annual instruction time. However,
the social composition of a school’s student population also affects the intergenerational
transmission of education, and it interacts with the annual instruction time, such that the effect of
school social composition on a child’s achievement is stronger in education systems with a longer
instruction time. This challenges the theory that by extending the school year policymakers could
minimise social inequality in education (a theory that would be confirmed if we looked only at
micro-level data). The findings inform debates about the influence of education policies on social
stratification and mobility in Europe.
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21. Introduction
Governments all over Europe have agreed that children have a right to education on the basis of
equal opportunity (UN General Assembly, 1989). Education shall allow children to develop their
personality, talents and abilities, and the principle of equal opportunity shall ensure the eradication
of discrimination (e.g., related to gender, beliefs or social origins). Meritocratic education systems
aim to guarantee equal educational opportunity. In these systems, children’s educational
attainments should be in direct proportion to their merit. However, formal equality of opportunity
does not readily translate into substantive equality of opportunity. Research has demonstrated
social disparities in educational attainment; children of less educated parents tend to end up being
less educated themselves (Hertz et al., 2007). On average across OECD countries, for example,
only one in five students, whose parents have low levels of education, attains a degree in tertiary
education, compared to two thirds of students who have at least one parent with tertiary education
(OECD, 2012a). Hence parental education tends to determine that of their children; moreover the
degree of intergenerational transmission of educational attainment may be considered a measure
of inequality of opportunity in a society.
In contrast to the inequality of opportunity interpretation, it could be argued that
differences in educational attainment reflect differences in natural abilities (i.e., genetics),
transmitted from parents to children. However, growing up poor significantly decreases the
chances of escaping poverty, irrespective of individuals’ actual intellectual ability (Fischer et al.,
1996). Similarly, children’s educational attainments frequently vary by social, cultural and economic
characteristics of the household in which they are raised, even if their cognitive skills are assumed
to be comparable (Jerrim, Vignoles, Lingam, & Friend, 2015; Pfeffer, 2008).
To date, there seems to be no country without a social gradient in educational attainment.
However, significant differences exist between countries with respect to the magnitude of this
gradient (Breen, Luijkx, Müller, & Pollak, 2009). This indicates that country-specific contexts
influence how parents can transmit school-related knowledge and skills and shape their children’s
educational opportunities. A considerable body of comparative research has examined macro
foundations of children’s educational opportunities (e.g., Breen & Jonsson, 2005; Kerckhoff, 2001;
Müller & Karle, 1993; Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993; Treiman & Ganzeboom, 2000),1 and research has
also specifically addressed the question of how education systems and policies influence
educational inequalities (e.g., Kerckhoff, 1995; Van de Werfhorst, & Mijs, 2010; see also section 2).
Arguably, one of the most intensely studied characteristics of education systems in this context has
been tracking, or allocation of students to different types of schools or educational programmes,
structured hierarchically by student performance and usually differing by the curriculum offered
(Hanushek & Wössmann, 2006; Lucas, 2001; Robinson, 2008). Typically, this research has
compared tracked (selective) systems with comprehensive systems (where low- and high-
performing students are schooled together during most or all of secondary education) with regard
to the degree to which these systems influence social gradients in educational outcomes. This is an
important question as comprehensive school reform has been a popular approach to school
improvement in several countries in Europe and beyond (Desimone, 2002; Hall, 2012; Iannelli &
Paterson, 2007; Leschinsky & Mayer, 1999; Machin, Salvanes, & Pelkonen, 2012), and the question
of whether comprehensive systems are more or less equitable than selective systems remains a
1 Research also exists on the question of how institutional structures of education systems determine labour market
outcomes and occupational destinations (e.g., Andersen & Van de Werfhorst, 2010; Kerckhoff, 2001). However, this
research is beyond the scope of this paper.
3subject of debate in many countries and among international organisations (OECD, 2013; and
section 2.3)
One of the shortcomings of much research on tracked versus comprehensive education
systems is that it tends to neglect other important dimensions relating to the selectivity or
comprehensiveness of education systems – or to the extent to which individual students receive
different (or the same) types and amounts of education. Drawing on a broader theoretical
framework, the current study goes beyond previous work by assessing how four dimensions of
education systems influence the intergenerational transmission of education in 31 European
countries: (1) pre-primary education enrolment rates, (2) public/private school sectors, (3) tracking
during compulsory education, and (4) the annual instruction time, or the amount of time that
children spend at school annually. These four dimensions – hereafter also referred to as education
policies – reflect different aspects of the comprehensiveness of education systems. Theory suggests
that they can affect the transmission of education across generations (see section 2). Furthermore,
in several countries, policymakers have implemented reforms relating to these policy dimensions
with the objective of improving equity in education (OECD, 2015).
First, access to pre-primary education has been expanded in most European countries. For
instance, a marked increase in enrolment rates has been observed between 1999 and 2009 in
countries such as Lithuania (from 48.3% to 73.3%), Estonia (75.7% vs. 91.7%), Sweden (75.7% vs.
94.2%), and Norway (74.8% vs. 97.3%), to name but a few (ILO, 2012). It has been argued that an
extensive system of preschool education is a sine qua non to minimise the ‘social inheritance’ of
educational advantage and of social status, but only few studies have examined this claim
empirically (Esping-Andersen, 2008; Field, Kuczera, & Pont, 2007).
Second, a number of countries have increased public funding for private schools – through
school vouchers, tuition tax credits, or direct subsidies to private schools – to partially offset the
impact of family background on educational attainment (OECD, 2012b; Toma, 1996). For
example, public funding for private schools has been increased in the 1990s in Sweden (Björklund,
Edin, Fredriksson, & Krueger, 2004), England (Whitty, 1997), Hungary, and the Czech Rebublic
(Filer & Münich, 2000). It has been argued that combining private management of schools with
public funding may be conducive to student performance and equity in education systems, but
empirical evidence in this regard is still scarce (Schütz, Ursprung, & Wössmann, 2008; Wössmann,
2008).
A third policy strategy aimed at reducing social gradients in education has been to de-track
schools (Rubin, 2006). Many European countries have delayed the start of tracking in their
education systems, beginning with Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom and Italy in the 1960s,
and continuing with Finland in the 1970s, France in the 1980s, and Spain and Portugal in the 1990s
(Brunello, Rocco, Ariga, & Iwahashi, 2012). However, significant differences still exist with regard
to the onset of tracking in European education systems and it remains unclear to what extent these
differences influence the intergenerational transmission of education, when examined in a
comparative framework.
Finally, policymakers have focused attention on extending the length of the school day or
year as a means to enhance student achievement (Pittman, Cox, & Burchfiel, 1986). Such policies
have been implemented over the last years, for instance, in Germany (Freitag & Schlicht, 2009),
the Netherlands (Meyer & van Klaveren, 2013), and Denmark (Jensen, 2013). While the evidence
of effects of instruction time on overall student achievement is mixed, research suggests that the
intergenerational reproduction of social classes can be minimised in education systems that
4intensify exposure to formal schooling through an increase in the amount of schooling that children
receive in a given school year (Patall, Cooper, & Allen, 2010; Schütz et al., 2008). A longer annual
instruction time reduces the influence of family effects on children’s education to some extent,
which may primarily benefit children from lower classes who are at higher risk of school failure.
What is missing in the literature, however, is a comparative analysis of the effects of the length of
the school year on educational inequality (for an exception see Long, 2014).
Considering these open questions, the influences of education policies on educational
inequality merit study. Besides, detailed knowledge of the transmission of education across
generations is important for at least two further reasons. First, parental education is among the
primary predictors of children’s educational attainment (Ou & Reynolds, 2008). Second, since the
first generation of mobility research (Ganzeboom, Treiman, & Ultee, 1991), education has been
considered as the main factor in both social mobility and the reproduction of social status across
generations (Hout & DiPrete, 2006). Against this background, this study extends research on social
stratification and mobility by analysing whether cross-national differences in the
comprehensiveness of education systems – in terms of pre-primary enrolment rates, public/private
sectors, tracking, and annual instruction time – contribute to explain associations between parental
education and children’s educational achievement.2
2. Dimensions of comprehensive education and their influences on the intergenerational
transmission of education
‘Comprehensiveness’ has been regarded as “the leading idea in implementing the basic values of
equity in education” (Sahlberg, 2007, p. 154). Theory suggests that comprehensive education, in its
ideal-typical form, aims to ensure and enrich educational provisions for all pupils and to equalise
educational opportunities throughout individuals’ educational careers, with as little differentiation
between pupils as possible (Arnesen & Lundahl, 2006; Phillips, 2003; Pring & Walford, 1997). The
comprehensiveness of education systems can be assessed on a continuum ranging from highly
comprehensive education – which is socially inclusive, driven by egalitarian politics, and
continuously concerned with the redistribution of opportunity – to highly selective and divisive
education – which differentiates early between pupils and emphasises competition among students.
Highly selective systems are committed to market values and elitism, they are driven by political
liberalism, and characterised by comparatively large private school sectors (Wiborg, 2009). They
consider education to a greater extent to be a private responsibility, which may also translate into
a minor importance given to the preschool sector and a shorter annual instruction time. This
section reviews research on the influences of four dimensions of comprehensive education on
educational inequalities and presents the hypotheses of this study.
2.1 Pre-primary education
Children who grow up in socioeconomically disadvantaged families typically enter school with
fewer skills than their more advantaged peers, and considerable gaps in educational achievement
persist during subsequent school years (Heckman, 2006). Given that children acquire a wide range
2 The paper distinguishes between educational achievement (performance as measured by standardised tests) and
attainment (typically measured by school graduation or highest level of education completed). As opposed to much
prior research on educational inequalities, this study does not consider how a composite measure such as
socioeconomic status affects children’s education. Instead, it isolates and disentangles the role of parental education in
the intergenerational transmission of educational advantage.
5of skills in early childhood during sensitive periods when the brain is particularly receptive to
environmental influences, early childhood education has been proposed to partially offset the
impacts of disadvantage and adverse learning environments on child development (Barnett, 2011).
Different types of programmes – from the infancy period to early primary education, from
intensive small-scale programmes to large-scale public programmes – have been examined in terms
of their potential to reduce achievement gaps in education (Anderson et al., 2003; Burger, 2010;
Currie, 2001; Sylva et al., 2014). There is now ample empirical evidence from various countries
showing that the majority of programmes designed to support child development during the
preschool period have substantial positive short-term effects and moderate or weak longer-term
effects on children’s academic skills (Barnett, 1998; Hasselhorn & Kuger, 2014; Melhuish et al.,
2013; Spiess, Büchel, & Wagner, 2003).3 Moreover, these programmes can supplement the learning
environments of children at risk of unfavourable development by compensating for the lack of
informal learning opportunities in families that do not ascribe great importance to education.
Children from disadvantaged families tend to make more developmental progress in early
childhood education than children from more advantaged families (Sylva, 2014). In other words,
early childhood education can diminish social class differentials in children’s skills and help
establish equal educational opportunity. However, whether or not early childhood education has a
compensatory effect (i.e., produces stronger positive paths for disadvantaged children) seems to
depend on a variety of factors including the type of programme and the group composition (e.g.,
Biedinger, Becker, & Rohling, 2008; Vandell et al., 2010). A recent review of studies suggests, for
instance, that there is empirical support both for the thesis that children across social classes benefit
in equal measure from early childhood education and for the compensatory effects hypothesis
whereby children from lower social classes benefit more in relative terms (Burger, 2010).4
It is important to note that in virtually all countries disadvantaged children have less access
to pre-primary education, in particular where pre-primary education is not widespread (OECD,
2011a). Extending the pre-primary sector and thus making it more accessible for disadvantaged
children should therefore reduce achievement gaps between children of diverse origins. A few
cross-national comparative studies have assessed relationships between national pre-primary
enrolment rates and social inequalities in education and suggest indeed that the association between
family background and children’s achievement is weaker in countries with higher pre-primary
enrolment rates (Esping-Andersen, 2008; Schütz et al., 2008). Thus, given that educationally
disadvantaged children are more likely to be enrolled in pre-primary education in countries with
higher enrolment ratios, and given that pre-primary education can improve children’s educational
outcomes, I hypothesise that the degree of intergenerational transmission of education is lower in
countries with higher pre-primary enrolment ratios (hypothesis 1).
2.2 Private schooling
3 The only type of programme that consistently seems to produce negative effects is early, extensive and continuous
centre-based childcare which notably tends to increase the risk of externalising problem behaviour and less harmonious
parent-child relations (Belsky, 2001).
4 Moreover, there is an ongoing debate on the conditions under which early education can best exert its positive
influences and on why some positive effects fade out over the course of schooling whereas others are sustained into
adolescence and adulthood (Barnett, 1998; Gorey, 2001). Factors to be considered include the pedagogical quality of
institutions, the curricula, and the duration and intensity of programme attendance (Burger, 2010, 2014; Gray &
McCormick, 2005; OECD, 2012c; Vandell et al., 2010).
6There has been a debate about differences in the effectiveness of private and public schools
(Cherchye, De Witte, Ooghe, & Nicaise, 2010). It has been presumed, for instance, that private
schools may be better able to tailor their instruction to the needs of students and to provide more
individualised attention (Braun, Jenkins, & Grigg, 2006). So far, however, research has yielded
inconsistent findings with regard to the hypothesis that private schools are more effective in
supporting student learning when individual characteristics are controlled for (Dronkers & Avram,
2010; Gamoran, 1996; Rangvid, 2008; Vandenberghe & Robin, 2004). It seems that where private
schools ‘produce’ higher average achievement, this superiority can be attributed to the fact that
private schools may constitute ‚functional communities’ which are characterised by a high level of
value consistency (consensus about the significance of education) and shared social capital among
its members (Coleman & Hoffer, 1987), or to the fact that private schools exhibit a better school
climate which favours learning (Dronkers & Robert, 2008). Furthermore, private schools
frequently admit students based on academic achievement, and academic achievement is associated
with social origin (Jenkins, Micklewright, & Schnepf, 2008; Tavan, 2004). In this regard, private
schools contribute to social segregation by attracting children who perform well at school (Hsieh
& Urquiola, 2006) and children who come from higher social strata (Jerrim, Chmielewski, & Parker,
2015; Lankford & Wyckoff, 2001). Cross-national comparative studies support the hypothesis that
social segregation in education systems increases as the proportion of private schools at national
levels increases (Alegre & Ferrer, 2010; Le Donné, 2014). This indicates that social disparities in
educational achievement might be stronger in countries with a larger private school sector as a
greater proportion of children from educationally and socially advantaged homes are likely to be
schooled together in private schools (and thus separated from less advantaged children who tend
to attend public schools). In sum, a higher proportion of private schools in a country seems to be
related to greater social segregation and thus greater social-class related inequality in school learning
environments. I therefore hypothesise that the size of the private school sector in a country –
conceptualised as the share of schools that demand fees – is positively related to the degree to
which parents can transmit educational advantages to their children (hypothesis 2).
2.3 Educational tracking
The central motive behind tracking is that homogeneous classrooms allow for more effective
instruction, adapted to the needs and skills of the students who are grouped together. The effects
of tracking have been examined repeatedly. On the one hand, studies suggest that tracked systems
and comprehensive systems are comparable in terms of their impact on social gradients in
education. For instance, evidence from Great Britain, France and Germany suggests that the shift
from a selective to a comprehensive secondary school system did not (or only marginally) decrease
social-class related gaps in educational outcomes or affect rates of social class mobility (Ambler &
Neathery, 1999; Boliver & Swift, 2011; Glaesser & Cooper, 2012). Besides, tracking may also partly
equalise educational opportunities among students from different social strata (Holm, Jaeger,
Karlson, & Reimer, 2013) and promote educational mobility by attracting students into higher
education who would not typically proceed to these educational tracks (Erikson & Hansen, 1987).
On the other hand, a considerable body of research suggests that social class disparities in education
are smaller in comprehensive education systems (Brunello & Checchi, 2007; Dupriez & Dumay,
2006; Marks, 2005). This research points out that selective systems which differentiate between
educational tracks at an early age tend to be less egalitarian than comprehensive systems where
students with varying academic abilities are schooled together (Bauer & Riphahn, 2006; Brunello
7& Giannini, 2004; Gorard & Smith, 2004). Comprehensive education reforms in Sweden and
Finland seem to have increased intergenerational social mobility (Meghir & Palme, 2005;
Pekkarinen, Uusitalo, & Kerr, 2009); and research using cross-nationally standardised data mostly
confirms that early tracking intensifies the impact of social origin on educational achievement and
thus exacerbates educational inequalities (Horn, 2009; Le Donné, 2014; Schütz et al., 2008),
although there are differences between countries with regard to the way in which tracking exerts
its influence on educational inequality (Schlicht, Stadelmann-Steffen, & Freitag, 2010).
Theory suggests that tracking may induce social stratification because learning
environments in tracks with low-performing students tend to be systematically less favourable.
Selection into different tracks may be affected directly or indirectly by family background, with
better educated parents being more likely to enrol their children in academic tracks (Brunello
& Checchi, 2007). Even where students are assigned on the basis of formal tests or administrative
decisions, children from better-educated families are more likely to be selected into more
demanding educational tracks because less-educated parents tend to have lower expectations
regarding their children’s educational performance, less knowledge about the educational
requirements of more demanding tracks and less confidence that their children will fulfil these
requirements, and they are consequently less likely to encourage their children to aspire to such
demanding tracks or to invest in the education of their children (e.g., in private lessons or
preparatory courses for tests). Research indicates that track placement reinforces the
intergenerational persistence of educational achievements in particular if it takes place early and
persists over the course of schooling (Bauer & Riphahn, 2013), because in tracking systems peer
effects and curricular differences between different tracks may increase differences in educational
performance that had already existed prior to the selection (Horn, 2013). Hence I hypothesise that
more extensive tracking during compulsory education increases the transmission of education
across generations (hypothesis 3).
2.4 Annual instruction time
If there were no schools at all, the transmission of education across generations would depend
entirely on families and neighbourhoods. Given that middle-class parents tend to engage more
actively in the education of their children than working-class parents (Lareau, 2002), the question
arises whether the amount of time that children spend at school moderates the intergenerational
links in education. Research found that socioeconomic gaps in children’s academic skills increase
during summer vacations when the school is not in session (Downey, von Hippel, & Broh, 2004).
While the skills of children from upper socioeconomic strata continue to advance, those of children
from lower strata tend to stagnate (Alexander, Entwisle, & Olson, 2001). This indicates that schools
can equalise skill levels among children from different backgrounds as children from all social
classes are socialised in a similar manner at school. Against this background, I hypothesise that the
degree of intergenerational transmission of education is weaker in education systems with a longer
annual instruction time, that is, where children spend more time at school per year (hypothesis 4).
3. School composition and intergenerational transmission of education
In addition to parents’ educational background, the composition of a school’s student population
also tends to influence a child’s education (Coleman et al., 1966). Peers in school affect learning
environments, serve as role models and influence how pupils engage in competition. They
influence a child’s aspirations and attitudes towards education which, in turn, may affect
8educational achievement. Schools with large proportions of students from socioeconomically
privileged families ‘generate’ better academic performance among students than those with smaller
shares of advantaged students (Perry & McConney, 2010), and students from higher
socioeconomic composition schools are more likely to transition into educational institutions with
higher academic requirements (Palardy, 2013).
School composition effects have been conceptualised as the effects of aggregated student
characteristics (e.g., socio-economic status) at the school level on children’s achievement when
these characteristics have been taken into account at the individual level (Dumay & Dupriez, 2008).
To the extent that the school composition can shape educational performance independently from
a student’s initial ability and social status (Opdenakker & van Damme, 2001), the school
composition may moderate processes of intergenerational transmission of education. Hence I will
analyse whether the school educational composition – as indexed by a school’s average parental
educational background – contributes to the transmission of education across generations. I
hypothesise a positive relationship between school educational composition and students’
educational achievement after accounting for parental education at the individual level. Moreover,
if school composition affects a child’s achievement, the amount of time that a child spends at a
particular school might increase the effect of school composition on a child’s achievement. Thus,
I also test the hypothesis that the longer the annual instruction time is, the stronger the influence
of the school composition on a child’s achievement will be.
4. Data and measures
This study draws on individual- and school-level data from the 2012 wave of the Programme for
International Student Assessment (PISA), which provides wide-ranging cross-national information
on students’ achievement, their family backgrounds, and school characteristics. Country-level data
are derived from different data repositories and statistical institutes (see Table 2). The sample
consists of 203,240 15-year-old students who attended 8,665 schools in 31 European countries.
The dependent variable – students’ educational achievement – is estimated in the form of
five plausible values measuring mathematical performance (see Appendix A). Mathematical
performance has been used successfully as a proxy for educational achievement in previous studies
on educational policies and inequalities and it is used here to ensure comparability with these studies
(Bol, Witschge, Van de Werfhorst, & Dronkers, 2014; Levels, Dronkers, & Kraaykamp, 2008;
Stadelmann-Steffen, 2012). Analyses using either science or reading achievement as dependent
variables corroborate the results. To determine population statistics and their respective standard
errors, I use the standard approach for PISA data analysis, where each plausible value is used
separately for any analysis and, subsequently, the results of these analyses are aggregated to obtain
the final estimates of the statistics. This procedure is performed using the final student weights and
the replicate weights provided in the PISA datasets (OECD, 2009).
The central covariate at the individual level is the highest level of education of the parent
with the higher educational background, hereafter referred to as parental education. Parental
education was measured both in ISCED categories and in years of full-time schooling. ISCED
categories allow for comparisons of educational levels across countries (UNESCO, 2006). They
represent the levels of education from pre-primary education to the second stage of tertiary
education, as shown in Table 1. Given the cross-national nature of this research, and for the sake
of comparability with previous studies (Schlicht et al., 2010; Stadelmann-Steffen, 2012), I use the
categorised education variable. Analyses using years of education lead to the same conclusions. In
9addition, the analyses include the individual-level covariates sex, immigrant status, home language,
school grade at assessment, and family wealth. At the school level, the central covariate is an
aggregate index measuring parents’ average educational level.
Table 1. Levels of parental education, measured in ISCED categories, as used in PISA
ISCED 0 Pre-primary education
ISCED 1 Primary education, first stage of basic education
ISCED 2 Lower secondary education, second stage of basic education
ISCED 3C, 3B (Upper) secondary education, providing direct access to the labour market or
to ISCED 5B programmes
ISCED 3A, 4 (Upper) secondary education, providing access to ISCED 5A programmes
ISCED 5B Tertiary education, first stage, leading to a degree not equivalent to a first
university degree
ISCED 5A, 6 Tertiary education, second stage, leading to a university degree or to an
advanced research qualification
At the country level, four variables are used (see Table 2). Pre-primary enrolment refers to the
percentage of pupils who had attended pre-primary education (ISCED 0) for at least one year or
less, as opposed to pupils who had not attended this type of education at all. Analyses based on a
more conservative indicator of pre-primary enrolment, which includes only children who had
attended pre-primary education for more than one year, confirm the findings. Private school sector
designates the proportion of students who had attended private schools in primary and secondary
education, compared to the total number of students in these grades. In contrast to public schools,
private schools demand fees for the services that they provide. Both government-independent and
government-dependent private schools belong to the private school sector and are included in the
indicator. Averaged data are used for the period 2003 to 2012 – these are the years when the
children in the PISA sample attended primary and secondary schools. Tracking in compulsory education
refers to the proportion of time that children spent in a tracked system during primary and
secondary education. A tracked education system consists of at least two tracks with different
academic requirements. Annual instruction time (or taught time) in primary and secondary education
indicates the amount of time that children spent at school during a school year. In addition to these
policy variables, the analyses contain the following control variables at the country level: gross
domestic product per capita, overall level of parental education, and inequality in parental education (countries
with less inequality in parental education might have smaller associations between parental
education and children’s educational achievement due to restricted ranges of the independent
variable). Information about the covariates, their operationalisation, and descriptive statistics can
be found in Appendix B.
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Table 2. Education policy variables in 31 European countries and number of students and schools
in the sample
Country Pre-primary
enrolment
(%) (1)
Private
school
sector
(%) (2)
Tracking in
compulsory
education
(%) (4)
Annual
instruction
time (6)
Number
of
students
(9)
Number
of
schools
(9)
Austria 98.22 8.16 68.0 822.08 4251 191
Belgium 97.62 55.07 50.0 886.00 7452 287
Bulgaria 89.75 1.71 41.7 687.00 4952 187
Croatia 73.19 1.19 33.3(5) 555.00 4846 163
Czech Republic 96.80 5.76 61.5 765.56 5072 297
Denmark 98.92 12.98 25.0 810.00 6546 341
Estonia 92.68 2.66 25.0(5) 714.67 4562 206
Finland 97.53 7.03 25.0 703.00 8447 311
France 98.21 21.35 25.0 932.00 4178 226
Germany 96.68 6.88 69.2 759.83 3632 230
Great Britain 94.96 30.08 15.4 830.82 11524 507
Greece 95.40 6.25 25.0 723.77 4816 188
Hungary 99.50 11.98 66.7 682.66 4633 204
Iceland 97.93 5.49 28.6 810.60 3275 134
Ireland 86.37 0.72 18.2 923.00 4770 183
Italy 95.72 6.26 38.5 782.10 27404 1194
Latvia 88.69 1.21 25.0 674.44 4071 211
Lithuania 69.53 0.69 66.7(5) 754.50 4278 216
Luxembourg 95.37 12.81 46.2 1'010.40 4282 42
Netherlands 97.69 39.05 50.0 950.44 4089 179
Norway 92.08 4.47 16.7 774.20 4338 197
Poland 97.50 5.34 38.5 730.22 4372 184
Portugal 85.04 14.66 25.0 920.17 4933 195
Romania 95.47 0.85 23.0(5) 830.60 4983 178
Serbia 79.66 0.91(3) 50.0(5) 928.00(8) 4438 153
Slovakia 93.18 7.90 61.5 774.00 4452 231
Slovenia 85.34 1.58 33.3 715.33 5578 338
Spain 94.08 29.86 16.7 945.00 24037 902
Sweden 91.78 8.62 25.0 740.55 4155 209
Switzerland 98.15 6.13 27.3 805.67(7) 10197 411
Turkey 29.68 2.08 54.5 802.00 4677 170
Note: Own calculations: (1) enrolment rates, data from PISA 2012; (2) average enrolment rates in the private school
sector, 2003-2012, data from Eurostat (2014); (3) data from UNESCO (2014); (4) proportion of tracking during
compulsory education; the data, derived from Brunello and Checchi (2007), refer to 2002 and are the most accurate
data for the relevant time period (tracking regimes remained stable over time in most countries); the variable is defined
as the ratio of (t3 – t2), where t3 is the age at the end of compulsory education (ISCED 3) and t2 is the age of first
selection into tracks, to (t3 – t1), where t1 is the age when primary education starts; (5) imputed figures, data from
Classbase (2014); (6) measured in hours, data from Eurydice (2013), (7) data from OECD (2011), (8) data from UNESCO
(2011), (9) PISA 2012 data.
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5. Methodology
First, this study assesses the degree of intergenerational transmission of education in European
countries by relating the educational achievement of 15-year-olds to the educational levels of their
parents. I create two indices of educational transmission, one focusing on the individual level and
a second one focusing on the school level. Specifically, I use multiple linear regression models to
estimate (1) student achievement as a function of parental education and (2) schools’ average
achievement as a function of schools’ average parental education (i.e., school educational
composition), controlling for confounding variables in both cases. The coefficients of these models
constitute a measure of the strength of the relationships between parental education and children’s
achievement at both individual and school levels.
Second, I apply multilevel modelling techniques to assess the interplay of characteristics of
students, schools and country-specific education policies (which represent different degrees of the
comprehensiveness of education systems). These techniques take into account the hierarchical
nature of the data by allowing for simultaneous modelling of individual- and context-level variables
(Snijders, & Bosker, 2012). I perform random intercept and slope models which imply that average
student achievement can vary across schools and countries. The models include cross-level
interactions to determine, first, whether the associations between parental education and children’s
achievement are moderated by the four education policies described above and, second, whether
the associations between school educational composition and children’s achievement are
moderated by the annual instruction time. The equation hereafter specifies the model that predicts
the educational achievement of a child as a function of individual-, school- and country-level
variables and cross-level interactions.5
Yijk= β000 + β1X1ijk+ … + βdXdijk + … + βnXnijk+ δ1 S1jk + α1W1k+ … + αmWmk + … + γ1 Xnijk ·
W1k+ … + γp Xnijk · Wmk + ζ1 S1jk · Wmk + (β100+ ν1k) Xnijk+ ν0k + μ0jk + ε0ijk.
Yijk denotes the educational achievement of a child i in school j in country k. A child’s educational
achievement is accounted for by the overall mean (β000), individual-level covariates (X1ijk toXnijk and
their respective estimates β1 to βn), a school-level covariate (S1jk and its estimate δ1), and country-
level covariates (W1k toWmk and their respective estimates α1 to αm). In addition, each country-level
covariate is interacted randomly with the individual-level covariate Xnijk, that is, parental education
(Xnijk · W1k to Xnijk · Wmk, the respective estimates being γ1 to γp). The country-level covariate Wmk,
that is, ‘annual instruction time’, is also interacted with the school-level covariate S1jk, or ‘school
educational composition’ (S1jk · Wmk, the respective estimate being ζ1). The model includes a
random slope ν1k~ (0, 1k) on parental education at the country level, thereby taking into account
that the effect of parental education on children’s achievement varies across countries. Adding a
random slope means adding a fixed effect for the country average on parental education as well as
a random effect which specifies the between-country variance in the slope. The random slope is
specified by the term (β100 + ν1k) Xnijk, where β100 is the slope of parental education Xnijk for the
average country and 21k shows how much variation there is in this slope between countries. The
model includes three residuals: ν0k~ (0, 0k) is the residual at the country level, μ0jk ~ (0, 20jk) is
the residual at the school level, and ε0ijk ~ (0, 20ijk) is the residual at the individual level. The
residuals are assumed to be mutually independent, to have zero means given the explanatory
5 The equation of the final model is shown; previously, a series of increasingly complex models had been computed.
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variables, and to be drawn from normally distributed populations. The population variances of the
country-, school- and individual-level residuals are denoted by σ 0k, σ 0jk, and σ 0ijk, respectively.
Finally, the model allows a correlation between the country-level random intercept β000 + ν0k and
the random slope ν1k.The tolerance and variance inflation factor values have been computed to test
for multicollinearity among the predictors. These values indicate no multicollinearity issues, thus
none of the individual-, school- or country-level predictors is redundant (grand mean-centred
continuous variables and dichotomous variables were used). Although multilevel analysis is a
standard technique to analyse data from the PISA surveys and from many other cross-sectional
comparative studies (e.g., Marteleto & Andrade, 2014; Stadelmann-Steffen, 2012), a limitation
needs to be acknowledged. Without taking into account prior student achievement, causal
inferences concerning the way in which parental education and educational policies interactively
lead to student achievement cannot be drawn unequivocally. Most cross-national research on
educational achievement faces this limitation (e.g., Byun, Henck, & Post, 2014; Schlicht et al., 2010).
In accordance with previous studies, I therefore include school grade as a proxy for prior
educational achievement in the analyses. Grade repetitions lead to variation in the grade
distribution of the 15-year-old students in the sample. Consequently, grade has been used as an
indicator of prior educational achievement where attending higher grades at the age of 15 means
having performed better during preceding school years (Chiu, 2010; Lee, Zuze, & Ross, 2005).
Note that grade repetition is a result of both ability and family background characteristics. Thus,
to some extent, grade repetition can be regarded as a mediating variable between family background
and a child’s current educational achievement (whether a child repeats a grade or not is affected by
family background). Accordingly, it could be argued that including grade level in the analysis may
lead to overcontrol and that, as a result, the analyses might underestimate the effect of parental
education on a child’s achievement. However, grade repetition can also be regarded as a mediating
variable between a child’s ability and achievement. Thus, if we removed grade level from the model
we would overestimate the effect of parental education because there would be no proxy for ability
(and prior achievement) left in the analysis at all. Including such a proxy is essential because in
cross-sectional studies without any proxy for ability and prior achievement the effects of family
background have been systematically overestimated and those of a child’s ability and achievement
have not been detected at all (Esser & Relikowski, 2015). Note, however, that as a result of
controlling for grade level, this analysis provides a conservative estimate of the effect of parental
education on a child’s achievement.
6. Results
6.1 Intergenerational transmission of education in European countries
The degree of intergenerational transmission of education in European countries has been
estimated in the form of coefficients from OLS regressions. Table 3 shows two indices of
educational transmission. (1) At the individual level, the degree of educational transmission is
measured as the mean change in students’ mathematical achievement when parental education
increases by one ISCED level. (2) At the school level, the degree of transmission is measured as
the mean change in a school’s average mathematical achievement (i.e., school educational
composition) associated with a one-level increase in a school’s average parental educational level.
On average, across the 31 countries, a one-level increase in parental education is associated with a
14.74 points higher child achievement, whereas a one-level increase in a school’s educational
composition is associated with a 42.93 points higher school achievement, which corresponds to
13
improvements in average achievement of approximately a 0.15 and 0.43 standard deviation,
respectively. The associations between school educational composition and average school
achievement are bivariate associations without controls at the individual level. They may be
mediated by differences in the curricula and academic requirements between schools, as children
from families with higher educational backgrounds may be enrolled in schools with extended
requirements more frequently than children from lower-educated families. However, regardless of
the potential mediating channels, the figures show that on average students’ educational
achievement is better in schools with greater proportions of children from more highly educated
families.
Table 3. Individual- and aggregate-level indices of intergenerational transmission of education
Country Transmission atindividual level
Transmission
at school level Country
Transmission at
individual level
Transmission
at school level
Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE)
Spain 8.17 (0.07) 31.03 (0.07) Great Brit. 13.88 (0.09) 20.57 (0.08)
Sweden 8.80 (0.24) 42.13 (0.22) Average 14.74 (0.12) 42.93 (0.14)
Italy 8.85 (0.08) 42.70 (0.11) Romania 15.26 (0.18) 38.84 (0.18)
Portugal 9.49 (0.18) 42.12 (0.22) Denmark 15.32 (0.26) 45.13 (0.23)
Switzerland 10.18 (0.21) 43.41 (0.20) Latvia 15.57 (0.55) 42.13 (0.51)
Luxembourg 10.60 (0.68) 34.82 (0.98) Austria 16.34 (0.24) 39.85 (0.23)
Iceland 12.00 (1.12) 38.71 (1.15) Greece 16.55 (0.20) 39.22 (0.24)
Netherlands 12.13 (0.17) 35.96 (0.16) Slovenia 18.10 (0.48) 41.76 (0.45)
France 12.37 (0.07) 41.18 (0.08) Croatia 18.10 (0.37) 42.85 (0.32)
Germany 12.54 (0.07) 44.42 (0.07) Ireland 19.34 (0.28) 37.54 (0.30)
Finland 12.54 (0.29) 41.49 (0.20) Bulgaria 20.83 (0.30) 39.25 (0.29)
Estonia 12.63 (0.69) 44.57 (0.63) Hungary 21.03 (0.19) 45.77 (0.23)
Turkey 12.87 (0.05) 50.52 (0.08) Lithuania 22.75 (0.47) 40.64 (0.38)
Serbia 13.01 (0.25) 41.16 (0.28) Slovakia 23.70 (0.37) 42.66 (0.25)
Belgium 13.26 (0.20) 44.33 (0.17) Czech R. 25.25 (0.29) 39.25 (0.21)
Norway 13.63 (0.38) 40.52 (0.27) Poland 26.86 (0.12) 39.80 (0.11)
Note: Coefficients of OLS regressions. The regressions include the following control variables: sex, home language,
immigrant background, school grade (in the individual-level analyses); aggregate variables for sex, home language,
immigrant background and school grade at the school level (in the aggregate-level analyses). Own calculations based
on data from the PISA 2012 wave; data are weighted, using the weights provided by the Programme for International
Student Assessment, so that the estimates are representative for each country. Very similar coefficients result when the
following covariates are entered additionally in the models: students’ age, families’ cultural possessions, home
educational resources, home possessions, and wealth.
In every country, parental education and the schools’ educational composition account for a
portion of the variation in student achievement and in schools’ overall achievement, respectively.
However, the cross-national differences in the intergenerational associations of education indicate
that country-specific factors play a role in shaping transmission processes. The coefficients range
from 8.17 to 26.86 in the individual-level analyses and from 20.57 to 50.52 in the school-level
analyses. This finding contributes to the debate about the extent to which student achievement is
a product of genetic inheritance or of environmental influences or of their interplay (Lucchini,
Della Bella, & Pisati, 2013). Given that nation differences in the degree of educational transmission
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cannot be attributed to genetics, the environment in which the intergenerational transmission
occurs obviously plays a role. Figure 1 shows a scatterplot of the indices of the transmission of
education at the individual level and school level, respectively. The relationship between the two
indices is positive, however its strength is almost negligible albeit statistically significant, r(29) =
.14, p < .01.
Fig. 1. Scatterplot of the two indices of transmission of education.
6.2 How education policies moderate the intergenerational transmission of education
The results of the multilevel analyses provide descriptive evidence on whether education policies
(or the comprehensiveness of education systems) can explain cross-country variations in the degree
of intergenerational transmission of education. Table 4 sets out the results of the full model. Less
sophisticated models fit the data less well. The model shows that the individual-level covariates are
associated with students’ mathematical achievement. As expected, parental education is related
positively to student performance. Furthermore, male students outperform female students. First-
generation immigrants perform below average in mathematics, whereas those whose home
language corresponds to the test language perform above average, as do those who are in higher
school grades6 and whose families possess higher levels of wealth.
The model also provides evidence that the schools’ educational composition is positively
related to student achievement even if parental education is held constant at the individual level.
Since PISA does not assess student ability, it is not possible to determine the extent to which the
relationship between school composition and student achievement is due to student ability or to
the actual impact of school composition (i.e., peer effects) on student achievement. Thus, the
school composition effect estimated here reflects either the effect of aggregated individual abilities
(and their influence on student achievement) or the combined effect of aggregated individual
abilities and peer effects.
Table 4 also indicates statistically significant cross-level effects of the pre-primary
enrolment ratio and of the size of the private school sector on student achievement. As the country-
6 As a result of grade repetitions not all the 15-year-olds included in the sample attended the same school grade at the
time of the assessment.
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level policy variables have been interacted with parental education, these main effects reflect the
effects of the country-level variables when the variable ‘parental education’ takes the value zero
(which represents average parental education given that parental education is centred at the grand
mean). Between-country differences in the effect of parental education on children’s educational
achievement are modelled by including a random slope on parental education at the country level.
Adding a random slope significantly improves the model fit, as indicated by a likelihood ratio test
based on a comparison of the deviances of a model with a random slope and a model without a
random slope on parental education, Χ2 (2, N = 203,240) = 1124.8, p < .001.
Table 4. Multilevel linear regression model explaining students’ mathematical achievement
Coefficient (b) (SE)
Fixed effects
Intercept 498.16*** (6.28)
Individual-level covariates
Parental education 13.58*** (0.87)
Sex (reference category female) 16.25*** (0.36)
First-generation immigrant -8.80*** (1.10)
Home language is test language 15.83*** (0.75)
School grade 55.16*** (0.35)
Family wealth 5.37*** (0.22)
School-level covariate
School educational composition 28.93*** (1.99)
Country-level covariates
Pre-primary enrolment 0.83* (0.37)
Private school sector 0.89** (0.37)
Tracking in compulsory education -0.06 (0.23)
Annual instruction time -0.05 (0.05)
Interactions
Parental education * Pre-primary enrolment 0.08 (0.06)
Parental education * Private school sector -0.03 (0.08)
Parental education * Tracking in compulsory education 0.09* (0.05)
Parental education * Annual instruction time -0.01+ (0.01)
School educational composition * Annual instruction time 0.01* (0.01)
Random effects
Random slope on parental education (SD) 17.4 (4.17)
Individual level variance (SD) 156817.3 (396.00)
School level variance (SD) 892.6 (29.88)
Country level variance (SD) 433.1 (20.81)
-2 log-likelihood 2446312
Note: Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses (fixed effects) and variance estimates with standard
deviations in parentheses (random effects). Wald tests were used to determine the significance of the coefficients of
the fixed effects, *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .10. The random slope on parental education was calculated
at the country level. Data were weighted using the weights provided by PISA such that each country contributes to
the analyses proportionally to their student-population size. The analyses include the country-level controls ‘overall
level of parental education’, ‘inequality in parental education’ and ‘gross domestic product per capita’.
When analysing interaction effects, it is essential not to consider solely the significance or
insignificance of the coefficients (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006). To facilitate the interpretation
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of the interaction effects, I plot the marginal effects of parental education on children’s educational
achievement at different levels of the policy variables. Figures 2 to 5 illustrate how the marginal
effect of parental education on children’s achievement changes across the range of a given policy
variable. The solid black line illustrates the marginal effect of a one-unit increase in parental
education on children’s educational achievement across the observed range of values of a policy
variable when all the other variables are held at their means. The 95 percent confidence interval
around this line, plotted in light grey, indicates the conditions under which parental education has
a statistically significant marginal effect on children’s educational achievement - notably whenever
both the upper and lower bounds of this interval are above the zero line.
Fig. 2. Marginal effect of parental education on children’s achievement as pre-primary enrolment
ratios change.
Figure 2 suggests that the positive effect of parental education on children’s achievement increases
slightly, but not significantly (see Table 4), as the pre-primary enrolment ratio grows. The
confidence interval visualises that the estimates are associated with increasing statistical uncertainty
at lower levels of the policy variable. This may be explained by the fact that the pre-primary
enrolment ratios were relatively high in most of the countries in the sample, the mean ratio being
90.69 percent. Only one country, Turkey, had an enrolment ratio of no more than 29.68 percent
(which corresponds to the value -55.99 of the centred variable in the graph). In the other countries,
the enrolment ratios ranged between 69.53 percent and 99.5 percent. The results indicate that
higher pre-primary enrolment ratios do not minimise the relationship between parental education
and children’s educational achievement. This is inconsistent with hypothesis 1. Two mechanisms
might explain this counter-theoretical finding. On the one hand, the insignificant effect of pre-
primary enrolment ratios on the intergenerational associations in education may be due to the fact
that effects of pre-primary education on children’s academic skills may disappear over the course
of formal schooling (as shown in earlier research, the advantages bestowed by preschool education
diminish during compulsory schooling as children who had experienced little or no preschool
education gradually catch up – see Burger, 2010; Magnuson, Meyers, Ruhm, & Waldfogel, 2007).
On the other hand, the insignificant effect might be explained by social gradients in the duration
of pre-primary attendance. Pre-primary enrolment ratios were assessed using a dichotomous
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variable that distinguished between children who had not been enrolled in pre-primary education
at all and those who had been enrolled for any given duration. A one-way analysis of variance
showed that children of better educated parents attended pre-primary education for longer periods
of time, F(6, 202156) = 1239.38, p < .001. Thus, a higher pre-primary enrolment rate in itself may
not be sufficient to reduce social gradients in educational achievement if children from higher social
strata are enrolled for a longer duration.
Fig. 3. Marginal effect of parental education on children’s achievement as the size of the private
school sector changes.
The size of the private school sector does not significantly change the effect of parental education
on children’s educational achievement (Figure 3 and Table 4). This might be the result of two
opposite effects that private school sectors may have, depending on their size. On the one hand,
they may generate social segregation and unequal school learning environments, divided along
social class disparities. On the other hand, the larger a private school sector is, the less private
schools can be used predominantly by higher-income and better-educated parents to transmit
educational advantages to their children. Countries with a large private school sector tend to have
a comparatively greater proportion of government-dependent (i.e., publicly subsidised) private
schools within their private sector. The correlation between the overall proportion of private
schools (government-independent and government-dependent) in a country and the proportion of
government-dependent private schools within the private sector is r(29) = .68, p < .001, according
to PISA 2012 data. That is, systems with larger private sectors offer more families the possibility
to send their child to private schools, which may reduce the effects on student achievement of
favourable student compositions, functional communities and a beneficial school climate in private
schools. As a result, the learning environments between private and public schools may no longer
differ significantly, the larger a private school sector becomes.
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Fig. 4. Marginal effect of parental education on children’s achievement as the proportion of
tracking changes.
As predicted by hypothesis 3 regarding the impact of tracking, a significant positive interaction
effect was found between the extent of tracking in an education system and parental education.
Figure 4 illustrates that the positive marginal effect of parental education on children’s educational
achievement increases with the extent of tracking, which corroborates findings whereby tracking
exacerbates educational inequalities associated with social origins (Hanushek & Wössmann, 2006;
Horn, 2009).
Fig. 5. Marginal effect of parental education on children’s achievement as the annual instruction
time changes.
As depicted in Figure 5, the longer the annual instruction time is, the smaller is the marginal effect
of parental education on a child’s achievement. A one-unit increase in parental education is
estimated to increase children’s achievement by approximately 18 points in education systems
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where children spend comparatively little time at school – e.g. in Croatia – and by around 10 points
in systems where they spend comparatively more time at school – e.g. in Luxembourg and the
Netherlands. This finding, although only marginally significant (p < .10), is in line with evidence
whereby increasing the instruction time decreases social inequalities in education (Bellei, 2009;
Schlicht et al., 2010). It seems to confirm the hypothesis of prior research that schools are more
likely to serve as ‘equalisers’ (Downey et al., 2004) among children, the more intense the schooling
that they provide. However, prior research did not look at how the annual instruction time interacts
with the social composition of the schools that students attend. This study addresses the question
and provides evidence of a significant interaction between school educational composition and
annual instruction time – specifically, Figure 6 illustrates that the effect of school educational
composition on a child’s achievement increases as the annual instruction time increases.
Fig. 6. Marginal effect of school educational composition on children’s achievement as the
annual instruction time changes.
Figures 2 to 5 indicate that parental education significantly impacts on children’s educational
achievement across the whole range of each of the observed education policy contexts, irrespective
of the values of the respective policy variables (the confidence intervals do not overlap with the y
= 0 line). This result is plausible as even in highly egalitarian education systems, parental education
cannot be expected to completely lose its influence on children’s educational achievement.
However, the marginal effect of parental education on children’s achievement is not constant
across the range of each of the policy variables, which suggests that the intergenerational
transmission of education is partly conditioned by the policies in question.
The random effects in Table 4 can be interpreted as the effects of any predictors that have
not been controlled for (or even measured) at the respective levels. The unexplained variance at
the individual level remains larger than the unexplained school- and country-level variances. This
means that the differences in student achievement which remain unaccounted for should be
attributed to a greater extent to (unmeasured) characteristics specific to students than to
(unmeasured) school- or country-level variables (i.e., shared environmental factors). This result is
consistent with sociological theory whereby relative to meso- or macro-characteristics, individual-
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level characteristics of students and families are more influential determinants of both student
achievement and inequalities in educational outcomes (Dronkers, 2010).
Note, again, that many factors related to educational institutions, policies, and wider societal
contexts can influence the intergenerational transmission of education. In the absence of
longitudinal data, causal inferences cannot be drawn unambiguously and the results thus remain
descriptive. To test the robustness of the results, another series of analyses has been performed.
First, the analyses were replicated replacing the ISCED-based measures ‘parental education’ and
‘school educational composition’ through measures based on the number of years of schooling
that parents had completed. Second, as mathematical achievement constitutes only one aspect of
educational achievement, the analyses were replicated using students’ reading and science
achievements as dependent variables. Third, to check for omitted variable bias, a set of models was
calculated with additional, potentially confounding covariates (at the individual level: cultural
possessions, home possessions, educational resources, family structure; at the country level:
expenditure on compulsory education, measured as percentage of the gross domestic product).
Finally, given that in some countries the provision of education differs by region, the analyses were
replicated using different subsamples of countries (removing, for instance, countries with
decentralised education policies such Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, and Switzerland from
the sample). These additional analyses confirm the findings and are available from the author (the
coefficient estimate of the interaction between ‘school educational composition’ and ‘annual
instruction time’ varied in size more than the estimates of the other interaction terms and it was
not statistically significant across all robustness tests).
In conclusion, although spurious relationships between characteristics of education systems
and the intergenerational transmission of education cannot be completely excluded (the study
provides associational, not experimental, evidence), the results, in combination with the robustness
tests, provide descriptive evidence that hypotheses 1 and 2 should be rejected, whereas hypotheses
3 and 4 can be confirmed. Moreover, the results indicate that the school composition and the
annual instruction time interactively shape children’s achievement – the effect of a favourable
school composition is stronger where the annual instruction time is longer – which had not been
shown in research previously.7
7. Conclusions
This study investigates how pre-primary sectors, private school sectors, tracking, and the annual
instruction time influence the intergenerational transmission of educational advantage in Europe.
The main conclusions are outlined hereafter.
7 Further variables have been found to influence social inequalities in education, including centralisation, school
autonomy (Kerckhoff, 1995; 2001), curriculum standardisation (Gamoran, 1996), central examinations (Bol, Witschge,
Van de Werfhorst, & Dronkers, 2014), and competition between schools (Arum, 1996). Against this backdrop, I had
performed numerous analyses using additional variables of theoretical interest, including: (1) an indicator of school
autonomy; (2) a country’s percentage of schools that use student assessments (a) to compare students to the national
student performance, (b) to monitor progress from year to year, and (c) to compare the school with other schools; (3)
an indicator of the extent to which schools compete with each other for students; (4) an indicator of the degree of
exam standardisation; and (5) an indicator of centralisation in education systems (using data from PISA and from Bol
and Van de Werfhorst (2013). At first sight, some of these models yielded interesting results. However, the coefficients
of the cross-level interactions involving these variables sometimes changed considerably when I tested the robustness
of the results, which cast doubts on whether these indicators can be used reliably in the analysis. Further research using
different data and samples would be valuable to elucidate the role of these variables in generating educational
inequalities.
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(1) Unlike previous research (Esping-Andersen, 2008), this study finds that the size of the
pre-primary sector does not significantly influence social gradients in educational achievement at
age 15. This might be due to the fact that social-class disparities exist in the duration of pre-primary
attendance in European countries, which make it difficult to assess the genuine effects of pre-
primary enrolment rates at national levels unambiguously. It should also be noted that the effects
of pre-primary education may vanish in the medium and long term, depending on the quality, type
and effectiveness of the programme (Burger, 2010). Hence it will be a task for future research to
further distinguish between the effects of pre-primary sectors of varying quality and type on the
transmission of education from parents to their offspring.
(2) The size of the private school sector does not seem to affect the intergenerational
transmission of education significantly. This is consistent with research that found insignificant
relationships between the prevalence of private schools and social gradients in education (Le
Donné, 2014; Pfeffer, 2007; Shavit, Arum, & Gamoran, 2007). Thus, private schools may lose a
part of their distinctive character in terms of student composition, the larger the private sector is.
This is probably related to the financing and thus accessibility of the private school sector.
Countries with a large private school sector have a greater proportion of government-dependent
private schools. Learning environments in these more accessible, publicly subsidised, private
schools may become comparatively less favourable, and privileged families may use private schools
to a lesser extent as instruments to transmit educational advantages to their children.
(3) The earlier education systems select students into different tracks, the stronger is the
degree of intergenerational transmission of education. This result is in line with the theory that
tracked education systems primarily favour children from more highly educated families, who on
average outperform children from less educated families, because peer effects in homogeneous
learning groups and curricular differences between different tracks can reinforce differences in
performance that had already existed prior to the selection into tracks (Brunello & Checchi, 2007;
Horn, 2013). De-tracking education systems might reduce the degree of intergenerational
transmission of education. However, research pointed out that different types of tracking – in
terms of the rigidity of tracking (Pfeffer, 2008) and of the curricula offered in different tracks
(Maaz, Trautwein, Lüdtke, & Baumert, 2008) – have different effects on educational inequality, or
that one particular tracking system may lead to varying degrees of segregation among students
(Felouzis & Charmillot, 2013). Research also indicates that the impact of tracking on educational
inequality can be attenuated by central examinations during compulsory education (Bol et al., 2014),
and a study from Japan illustrates that de-tracking reforms can have undesirable consequences as
they may drive well-performing students out of public schools and increase the separation between
students from different backgrounds (Kariya & Rosenbaum, 1999). Policymakers should take such
evidence into account before they seek to implement educational reforms.
(4) This study also indicates that a longer annual instruction time minimises the effect of
parental education on a child’s education. This seems to imply that by extending the school year
policymakers may be able to narrow gaps in performance between students of different social
origins. However, the very same policy variable – annual instruction time – can have an opposite
effect at the school level: The longer the annual instruction time is, the weaker is the association
between parental education and children’s educational achievement, but the stronger is the
association between school educational composition and children’s achievement. Consequently, I
caution against the analysis and interpretation of effects of schooling time at only the individual
level. Simply increasing the amount of schooling to reduce social gradients in education would
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constitute a simplistic approach to policy reform. Concrete reforms should draw on a systemic
approach that views the education system as a whole in terms of interrelated subsystems, taking
into account that changing a given policy variable may have paradoxical effects at different levels
within a system. Given these findings, I tentatively conclude that education systems with a longer
annual instruction time may be better prepared to ensure equality of educational opportunity only
if there are low degrees of social and academic segregation within the system because greater
segregation is likely to reinforce the effect of the annual instruction time on children’s achievement
(unequal school compositions increase the effects of the annual instruction time on educational
inequalities).
Substantively the moderating effects of the country-specific educational policies on
intergenerational associations in education are relatively small, comparable in size to those
identified in other cross-national studies on the impact of policies on achievement inequalities (Le
Donné, 2014; Schlicht et al., 2010). In future studies, more sizable effects might potentially be
identified if within-country variations in educational policies (i.e., in the comprehensiveness of
school systems) are taken into account (Freitag & Schlicht, 2009). However, it should be noted that
the evidence in this regard is mixed. For instance, in a study from Switzerland (Stadelmann-Steffen,
2012) the effects of sub-national policies on educational inequalities at sub-national levels were
similar to those of the national policies on educational inequalities at national levels estimated here.
This suggests that large-scale comparative policy analysis can be informative even if it does not
necessarily take into account regional disparities as exhaustively as smaller-scale studies. A
replication of the present study at sub-national levels may be expected to yield comparable findings
as the ones presented here.
Albeit beyond the scope of this paper, the question arises of how the findings of this study
relate to comparable research on longer-term outcomes of institutional arrangements and policies.
To my knowledge, no evidence exists on the effects of pre-primary enrolment rates or of the annual
schooling time on social gradients in attainment in education and in the labour market.8 However,
previous evidence (in line with this study) showed that the prevalence of private schools at the
secondary and tertiary level does not significantly affect social inequality in educational attainment
(Pfeffer, 2007; Shavit et al., 2007). Furthermore, it can be noted that educational tracking not only
affects inequality in achievement at age 15, but also impacts on longer-term inequality in education
and labour market outcomes. For instance, Pfeffer (2008), who focused on educational attainment,
found that highly stratified, rigid education systems with an early onset of tracking and dead-end
educational pathways hinder the equalisation of educational opportunities and limit
intergenerational educational mobility – a finding that confirmed earlier studies (Gamoran & Mare,
1989; Kerckhoff, 1995). Looking at both educational attainment such as college completion and
labour market outcomes such as earnings, Brunello and Checchi (2007) showed that school
tracking intensifies the effect of family background and reduces intergenerational social mobility.
However, findings in this regard are not unequivocal (Breen & Jonsson, 2005), and studies
comparing selective (tracked) and comprehensive school systems in Great Britain indicate that
neither of the two systems yields a social mobility advantage to children from any particular origins
(Boliver & Swift, 2011; Iannelli, 2011). Hence although tracking can exacerbate educational
8 But research indicates that expanding the (higher) education system may reduce the intergenerational transmission
of educational attainment (e.g., Kwenda, Ntuli, & Gwatidzo, 2015).
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inequality, a sweeping critique of tracking systems as the cause of low degrees of social mobility
seems unwarranted.
Overall, this study corroborates findings whereby education systems in European countries
struggle to grant every child the right to education on the basis of genuine equal opportunity,
despite the commitment by all European states to protecting this right (UN General Assembly,
1989). Since education systems typically work as ‘sorting machines’ that lay the foundations for
social hierarchies (Spring, 1976), establishing conditions that ensure equal educational opportunity
is fundamental. This study documents that, to a minor degree, national education policies can
influence the intergenerational transmission of educational advantage. It also shows that education
policies can exercise opposite effects on educational inequality at the individual level and the school
level, which has implications for theory and research on school improvement because it highlights
the necessity to take into account inequalities at different levels of analysis (micro, meso and
macro). Further research could compare the effects of education policies with those of other
contextual factors such as family interactions, neighbourhood effects, class composition effects,
and further institutional structures hypothesised to influence the intergenerational transmission of
education (e.g., centralisation or exam standardisation). This research would be valuable to assess
the role that policy reforms might play in comparison to other intervention strategies.
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Appendix A. Sampling and plausible values in PISA
The PISA surveys use two-stage stratified sampling. In the first stage, schools enrolling 15-year-
old students are selected with probabilities proportional to the size of the schools. Second, students
are sampled randomly within schools (the countries participating in the surveys differ to some
extent in their definition of schools: in some countries they may be administrative units that may
comprise several buildings, whereas in others individual buildings are considered as schools). PISA
uses imputation methods, referred to as plausible values, for reporting student achievement. As in
any item response scaling model, student achievement is not observed directly; it is inferred from
the observed item responses and conceptualised as a latent construct. Plausible values are a
selection of likely values for a student who attained a given score. They constitute a representation
of a range of achievements that a student might reasonably display. A probability distribution for
a student’s achievement is estimated, consisting of possible values with an associated probability
for each of these values. Based on the item parameters and international calibration, the plausible
values are drawn randomly from this distribution for each student (e.g., OECD 2012d).
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Appendix B. Variables, operationalization, descriptive statistics
Variable Operationalization Descriptive statistics
Dependent variables
Math achievement
scores in PISA
Plausible value 1 Mean: 492.10, SD: 93.15
Min: 95.19, Max: 896.80
Plausible value 2 Mean: 492.11, SD: 93.19
Min: 43.78, Max: 857.85
Plausible value 3 Mean: 492.17, SD: 93.16
Min: 83.28, Max: 865.56
Plausible value 4 Mean: 492.08, SD: 93.19
Min: 102.98,Max: 867.20
Plausible value 5 Mean: 492.20, SD: 93.23
Min: 60.92, Max: 849.36
Individual-level covariates
Parental education ISCED, 7 levels, the higher level of either
parent was used
Mean: 4.18, SD: 1.62
Min: 0, Max: 6
Sex 0: female, 1: male Female: 49.85%
Immigrant status 0: native or second-generation immigrant First-generation
1: first-generation immigrant immigrants: 3.83%
Home language 0: home language is not test language Same language: 91.94%
1: home language equals test language
School grade School grade compared to modal grade Mean: -0.09, SD: 0.59
Min: -3, Max: 2
Family wealth PISA index of family wealth Mean: -0.01, SD: 0.91
Min: -5.34, Max: 3.25
School-level covariate
School educational
composition
Aggregate index based on parents’ highest
ISCED level: average parental education
of a school
Mean: 4.18, SD: 0.38
Min: 2.00, Max:5.67
Country-level covariates
Pre-primary
enrolment
Percentage of children (1) who had been
enrolled in ISCED 0 at least one year or
less between 2001 and 2003, versus (0)
children who had never been enrolled
Mean: 85.67, SD: 23.55
Min: 29.68, Max: 99.50
Private school sector Average percentage of students in private
schools (ISCED 1-3), 2003-2012
Mean: 13.75, SD: 12.74
Min: 0.69, Max: 55.07
Tracking in
compulsory
education
Percentage of primary and secondary
school in tracking in 2002
Mean: 39.43, SD: 18.72
Min: 15.40, Max: 69.20
Annual instruction
time
Recommended taught time (hours) per
year in compulsory education in 2012
Mean: 820.22, SD: 79.56
Min: 555.0, Max: 1010.4
Overall level of
parental education
Aggregate index based on parents’ highest
ISCED level: Average parental education
of a country
Mean: 4.46, SD: 0.43
Min: 2.74, Max: 5.15
Inequality in parental
education
Variance in parental education in the
population of a country
Mean: 1.91, SD: 0.64
Min: 1.00, Max: 3.76
Gross domestic
product per capita
Measure derived from Eurostat Mean: 102.57, SD: 40.13
Min: 37.00, SD: 264.00
